ABSTRACT Secret sharing is one of the most important cryptographic primitives used for data outsourcing. The threshold-based secret sharing scheme is one of the well-known secret sharing schemes in cryptography. A single secret sharing scheme has low efficiency and multiple secret sharing schemes can greatly improve the efficiency of secret sharing. We present an efficient verifiable threshold multi-secret sharing scheme with different stages in which multiple secrets are shared among participants during one sharing process. In such a way, some qualified subsets of participants can collectively recover these secrets. The verifiable nature means that the participant can verify his/her own share. Our proposed scheme can share multiple secrets and each secret has its own threshold access structure. Moreover, each participant only keeps one share, and however they can reconstruct all secrets in recovery stages. This scheme is a multi-stage-use secret sharing scheme, in which the size of the participant's share is the same as that of each secret and the amount of information disclosed reaches the optimal lower bound. Compared with the previous verifiable (t, n)-threshold multisecret sharing scheme, this scheme is of stronger computational security and practicability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In real life, it is dangerous to keep some sensitive and important information, such as passwords of opening bank safes or launching missiles, by a single person, because the information is easy to be damaged, lost or tampered. Therefore, it is urgent to establish novel key dispersion schemes. In the custody system, a secret sharing system is established, and it is an important method to protect information security and data security. Secret sharing has very important applications in modern cryptography, such as key distribution, access control, secure multi-party computing, e-commerce, and even the control of missile launches. The earliest secret sharing scheme is the threshold-based secret sharing scheme, which was proposed by Biakley [1] and Shamir [2] in 1979, respectively. In general, the system of secret sharing assumes that both dealer and participants are honest, but this is unrealistic in real life. Therefore, these systems cannot effectively stop the dealer from cheating the participants (the dealer The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Congduan Li. distributes fake shares to some participants) and stop the participants from deceiving the other participants (some participants distribute false shares when reconstructing to the secret).
In order to solve these problems, several verifiable secret sharing schemes in [3] - [6] have been proposed. In these schemes, verification algorithm is added and participants can test whether the dealer distributes the false shares to restore the secret and moreover each participant can test whether other participants have provided a valid share. In [7] - [11] , several effective multi-secret sharing schemes have been proposed based on shamir threshold scheme. The shares are selected by the dealer and distributed to the participants through a secure channel. Since a secure channel needs to be established between the participant and the dealer, the scheme has relatively high requirements of the system. In a secret sharing scheme, dishonest participants and the dealer are likely to cheat the other participants during execution. To alleviate these concerns, we improve our scheme with verifiability properties, such as verifiable and publicly verifiable secret sharing. Verifiability stops the dealer from sharing wrong shares and hence public verifiability forces participants to submit their sub-shares correctly. In the multi-secret sharing schemes [12] - [17] , releasing some public values which are used in the recovering step is inevitable. He and Dawson [12] proposed the first multi-secret sharing scheme, in which many secrets were shared, and only one share was assigned to each participant. Their scheme has some limitations in the recovery phase. In fact, in their scheme, the recovery of secrets should be carried out in a predetermined order, otherwise it endangers the security of unrecovered secrets, which is undesirable. In their scheme, some public values are released by the dealer. These public values are used to restore the secrets. Typically, during the recovery phase, the parties calculate specific values about the target secret, which are known as sub-shares. This process is accomplished by an algorithm that needs the shares and index of the target secret and outputs the corresponding sub-share. The target secret can be recovered using these generated sub-shares and published public values. After their scheme, some other schemes have been also proposed to eliminate the constraint on recovering order and reducing the number of public values [14] . Less public values would be an advantage because it directly affects efficiency.
In the dynamic secret sharing schemes [18] - [23] , the main concern is the updates of secret and share, as well as the addition of new individuals or the deletion of the participant, which does not involve changes of the threshold value t. In the multi-secret sharing scheme, we propose a multi-stage secret sharing scheme, in which each secret corresponds to an independent threshold. When reconstructing multiple secrets with different threshold values, the secret holder needs to disclose part of the information in order to keep the number of shares saved by the participants as less as possible. In our proposed scheme, the participants' share is generated independently and randomly which has nothing to do with a single secret. All the secrets are also generated independently and randomly. For each secret, the secret holder publishes its own independent public information in advance, and the corresponding threshold value of each secret is determined by its public information.
As shown in Fig. 1 , most secret sharing schemes allocate n shares {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } generated by one secret K to n participants {1, 2, · · · , n}, and hence each participant has a share. Then, t participants are selected from the n participants, and their shares {s j 1 , s j 2 , · · · , s j t } are put together to recover the secret K , where {j 1 , j 2 , · · · , j t } ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Note that, the threshold t is fixed in these schemes.
As shown in Fig. 2 , in the proposed scheme, we generate n shares {s 1 , s 2 
Then the n shares are assigned to n participants {1, 2, · · · , n}, respectively. Any t i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) shares {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } and the public information f i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) can be employed to obtain the corresponding secret K i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m). Note that, each secret K i has its own threshold access structure (t i , n), where i = 1, 2, · · · , m.
In the proposed secret sharing scheme, in order to update the shared secret dynamically, each secret holder needs to disclose part of the information. Obviously, a sharing process can share multiple secrets at once, as long as the secret holder exposes multiple information in a certain order. In secret reconstruction process, all participants in the authorization subset can recover corresponding secrets based on the public information. Note that, if all secrets share a fixed threshold value, the security of the scheme reduces. In [19] - [21] , the main research focuses on the secret and share updates, as well as the addition of new individuals or the deletion of participants, and it does not involve changes in threshold values. In this paper, a verifiable threshold multi-secret sharing scheme with different stages was presented. The share of a participant is generated independently and randomly, and it is independent of a single secret. All secrets are randomly generated independently. For each shared secret, the secret holder publishes its own independent public information in advance, and the threshold value corresponding to each secret is determined by its public information. In conclusion, we propose a multi-secret sharing scheme that is used in multiple stages, and each secret corresponds to an independent threshold value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce some related work of this paper. Then, our new scheme is proposed. The security of our scheme is theoretically proved and the efficiency is also evaluated. Finally, we conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we mainly present some definitions or properties of the existing schemes which are related to the proposed scheme in this paper. Specifically, we will briefly introduce information entropy, mutual information, the access structure of (t, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes, verifiable secret sharing schemes, perfect threshold secret sharing schemes, and threshold multi-secret sharing schemes.
A. INFORMATION ENTROPY AND MUTUAL INFORMATION
Information entropy can be thought of as a mathematical measure of information or uncertainty, and is computed as a function of a probability distribution. Suppose X is a discrete random variable which takes values from a finite set X . Then, the information entropy of the random variable X is defined to be the quantity as follows: Mutual information is a useful measure of information in information theory, which can be viewed as the amount of information contained in a random variable about another random variable, or the uncertainty of a random variable reduced by knowing another random variable. Let (X , Y ) be a pair of random variables with values over the space X × Y. If their joint distribution is Pr(x, y) and the marginal distributions are Pr(x) and Pr(y), the mutual information is defined as follows:
Pr(x, y)log 2 Pr(x, y) Pr(x)Pr(y) .
B. ACCESS STRUCTURE
A (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme can map a secret K to a set of shares {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } which are distributed to n participants P = {1, 2, · · · , n}. In this way, any t (t ≤ n) participants can reconstruct secret K by putting their shares together and however a group with less than t members cannot do so. All the qualified subsets of P compose the access structure Γ . The method of sharing secret K among the n participants is perfect if it can realize the access structure with the following two properties: 1) The secret K can be determined by an authorized subset of participants when their shares are put together. 2) Nothing about secret K can be determined when the shares of an unauthorized subset of participants is pooled. Assume that A ∈ Γ and A ⊆ B ⊆ P. We further assume the subset B wants to determine secret K . Because A is an authorized subset, we can infer that B can determine secret K . This is reasonable considering that the subset B can determine secret K by ignoring the shares of the participants in B \ A. In other words, a superset of an authorized set is also an authorized set. This shows that the access structure should satisfy monotone property:
It can be observed that a (t, n)-threshold scheme realizes the access structure presented as follows:
Such an access structure is called a threshold access structure.
Assume that Γ is an access structure, then A ∈ Γ is a minimal authorized subset if A ∈ Γ whenever A ⊆ B, A = B. The set of minimal authorized subsets of Γ is denoted Γ 0 and is called the basis of Γ . Since the elements in Γ are made up of some subsets of P, these subsets are supersets of the elements in Γ 0 . Therefore, Γ is a uniquely determined function for Γ 0 , i.e., Γ = {B ⊆ P : A ⊆ B, A ∈ Γ 0 }.
In the proposed multiple secret sharing scheme, m secrets K 1 , K 2 , · · · , K m need to be shared, and each participant only needs to save one share S i . Furthermore, each secret K i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) has its own independent access structure Γ i . If subset A belongs to Γ i , then all participants in A can cooperate with each other to recover the secret
Otherwise, if any other subset B does not belong to Γ i , then all participants in B cannot cooperate with each other to recover the secret K i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m). The threshold multiple secret sharing scheme is a special case of multiple secret sharing scheme in general access structure, where Γ i = {A ⊆ P :
C. VERIFIABLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME Shamir's secret sharing scheme can only resist passive attacks, that is, its security depends on the parties in the scheme who honestly perform the operations scheduled by the protocol. However, the distribution center may be dishonest in reality. In the secret distribution protocol, it can make the shares of the distribution be not the parts of the secret to be shared, and hence the holders of the shares cannot recover the secret even if they all come together. In fact, even if the share S j sent to the participant j by a dealer is incorrect, the participant j cannot detect it, where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Similarly, in the secret reconstruction protocol, if the participant j does not use the correct share S j , and it uses a random value S j ∈ Z p , the final reconstructed secret K will be meaningless. If j is the only participant in the reconstruction process that does not use the correct share, then he can use the correct shares of the other t participants to calculate the real secret K being shared. It is precise because of the abovementioned active attacks and stronger secret sharing system needs to be designed to resist such potential attacks. As a consequence, a verifiable secret sharing system emerges as the times require.
The verifiable secret sharing scheme is a modification of the traditional secret sharing scheme, and it is mainly used to address issues of non-honest distribution center. The verifiable secret sharing schemes are designed based on the usual secret sharing schemes with additional verification operations. In the verifiable secret sharing scheme, the dealer distributes not only the shares of the secret but also some extra information about the secret fragments to the participants. Once a member receives his shares, he can verify whether the shares are correct based on the broadcasted information. In the secret reconstruction phase, each participant uses the same method to verify correctness of secret fragments of other members. It can be observed that the verifiable secret sharing is able to resist the following two kinds of active attacks:
1) Some shares are tampered before being sent to the participants in the secret distribution protocol. 2) Participants submit error shares to the secret reconstruction protocol.
D. PERFECT THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING SCHEME
There are m secrets K 1 , K 2 , · · · , K m to be shared, and it is required that, for any 1 ≤ ≤ m: 1) Any set of t shares determines the secret K , i.e., for any set of t indices 1
here S i denotes the share of participant i; 2) Any set of t − 1 shares gives no information about the secret K , i.e., for any set of t−1 indices 1
) denotes the uncertainty of K when event (S i 1 , S i 2 , · · · , S i t ) happens, and I (K ; (S i 1 , S i 2 , · · ·, S i t )) denotes the amount of mutual information between K and (S i 1 , S i 2 , · · · , S i t ).
E. THRESHOLD MULTI-SECRET SHARING SCHEME
In the multiple secret sharing scheme, each participant only needs to protect one share, and multiple secret sharing can be realized. There are m secrets K 1 , K 2 , · · · , K m are shared among n participants, and each participant keeps only one share. In addition, each secret K i has its own threshold access structure (t i , n), and satisfies the following terms: 1) According to the public information P i , any t i or more than t i users can recover the secret
If there is no public information P i , even if all users participate, K i cannot be restored, i.e., H (
If there are less than t i users, then the secret K i cannot be recovered, i.e.,
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present the information-theoretical secure and verifiable (t, n) threshold multi-secret sharing scheme with different stages. Then we analyze the security of the newly proposed scheme. We prove that our proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements for information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing schemes. At last, we discuss the performance of the scheme we designed. Our scheme has a comprehensive comparison with other well-known multisecret sharing schemes. Let's walk into the details of the scheme.
A. PARAMETERS
Without loss of generality, let Z p be a finite field, where p is a large prime number that satisfies p ≥ n + 1. Let P = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of n participants and D be the dealer. The threshold is denote by t i and m is the number of secrets need to share, where t i ≤ m. These parameters can be generated cooperatively by the dealer D and all participants.
Then the dealer secretly sends the share S j to participant j, where j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
For n + 1 points (0, K i ), (1, S 1 ), · · · , (n, S n ) constitute the following formula:
-D computes and broadcasts:
C. ALGORITHM OF VERIFICATION
When the participant j has received his shares S j , he examines whether the following equation holds:
can be obtained by any t i shares S j 1 , S j 2 , · · · , S j t i and the public information
Thereby, the n-degree polynomial can be constructed as follows:
Participants j 1 , j 2 , · · · , j t i can get the secret K i by substituting x = 0 into the above formula, i.e., K i = h(0), where i = 1, 2, · · · , m.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze correctness and security of the proposed scheme by three theorems. Theorem 1: Verification is successful if the dealer D follows the protocol accurately.
Proof: If the dealer D follows the protocol accurately, then we have the following:
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2:
The adversary cannot obtain any information about the secret K i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) from the public information.
Proof: When k = t i , we have the following:
In [24] , given
and
We have the following: 
Theorem 3: The secret K i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) cannot be recovered if the participant in the set A k ∈ Γ 0 is absent.
Proof: We consider the worst case: k = t i − 1. In this scenario, we have:
Theorem 3 is proved.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
One important factor in efficiency of a multi-secret sharing scheme is the number of public values. In any multisecret sharing scheme, releasing a number of public values is inevitable. In our proposed scheme, we try to give the minimum number of public values in the scheme.
With the continuous increase of t, m and n values, the number of public values in the schemes [12] - [17] also increases rapidly, as shown in Fig. 3 . It can be observed in Fig. 3 , n denotes the number of participants, m indicates the number of secrets to be shared, t represents the threshold value. When t is 5, m is 6, and n is 9, scheme [16] has the least number of public values among the existing well-known multi-secret sharing schemes. However, the number of public values in our scheme is about half of that in scheme [16] . Compared with other well-known multi-secret sharing schemes, [12] and [14] has the largest number of public values, which is 7.7 times the number of public values of our proposed scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, the number of public values for our scheme is minimal. To demonstrate this claim, our scheme is comprehensively compared with other wellknown multi-secret sharing schemes, as shown in Table 1 . Scheme [12] is the least number of public values among the proposed multi-secret sharing schemes. In the scheme [12] proposed by He and Dawson, the number of public values is m × n. In our design, the number of public values is m i=1 (n − t i + 1).
In conclusion, we have introduced a verifiable threshold multi-secret sharing scheme with different stages. It has the least number of public values among the multi-secret sharing schemes. Compared with other multi-secret sharing schemes, our proposed scheme can effectively prevent the dealer to share wrong shares, as shown in Table 1 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an efficient verifiable threshold multi-secret sharing scheme with different stages, in which multiple secrets can be shared in a single sharing process, and one secret can be reconstructed in each stage according to its own independent public information. First of all, we seamlessly integrate the verification algorithm to our secret sharing scheme so that any participant can verify the correctness of the shares. Furthermore, in the recovering stage, we have no constraint on recovering secrets order and authorized participants can reconstruct any secret in any stage. By the realization, in our design scheme, the threshold value is dynamic, and each secret has its own threshold access structure. This scheme is a multi-stage-use secret sharing scheme. We analyze the correctness and security of the proposed scheme through Theorems, respectively. Performance analysis is given to demonstrate that the scheme we designed has the least number of public values compared to the schemes proposed by others. Compared with the previous verifiable (t, n)-threshold multi-secret sharing schemes, our scheme is of great computational security and practicability. 
